商业银行风险论文英文文献综述

Make Every Document a Marketing Document Every scrap of paper that leaves your business is performing a marketing 's idea is not earthshattering, but it is one that many businesses, large and small, send invoices, fax covers, memo, notes, request and all other manner of "non-marketing" related correspondence to - you guessed it, your clients, referral sources and 's a pretty simple thing to A) make sure that these documents also conform to the image you project in your marketing materials and B) make them sell a no harm in introducing a new product in every communication, regardless of how mundane.

• Put your company story on the back of work orders
• List all of your products and services on fax covers
• Insert a coupon for a special offering in your statements
• Put two business cards in your thank you notes

附件二：毕业论文英文资料翻译英文资料一作者：Richard Podpiera题目：Progress in China’s Banking Sector Reform中国银行业改革的进步出处：IMF Working Paper Series 2006国际货币基金工作报告93号2006年3月英文资料二作者：Doug Pearce题目：Reform of China's Banks, Burdened by Bad Loans, is Priority for Government改革中国银行不良贷款带来的负担,是政府的要事出处：State Banks in Allocating Credit to Chinese State-Owned Enterprises Vol. 71, pp. 533–59June 2005中国股份制企业银行信用7卷，53-59页2005年6月I IntroductionThis Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate. Substantial effort has been devoted to reforming China’s banking system in recent years. The authorities recapitalized three large state-owned banks, introduced new governancestructures, and brought in foreign strategic investors. However, it remains unclear the extent to which currently reported data reflect the true credit risk in loan portfolios and whether lending decisions have started to be taken on a commercial basis. We examine lending growth, credit pricing, and regional patterns in lending from 1997 through 2004 to look for evidence of changing behavior of the large state-owned commercial banks (SCBs). We find that the SCBs have slowed down credit expansion, but that the pricing of credit risk remains undifferentiated and banks do not appear to take enterprise profitability into account when making lending decisions. Controlling for several factors, we find that large SCBs have continued to lose market share to other financial institutions in provinces with more profitable enterprises. The full impact of the most recent reforms will become clear only in several years, however, and these issues should be revisited in future reforms are at the core of China’s strategy to improve the intermediation of its large private sector savings. Reforms in the banking sector have been implemented over the last two decades in China, replacing the monobank system with a multilayered system that separates commercial lending and central banking functions. However, lending by stateowned commercial banks (SCBs) has been inefficient and focused on state-owned enterprises, has brought a large burden of nonperforming loans, and has triggered several attempts to recapitalize and reform the banks. One important restructuring action came in 1999, when the government transferred a substantial amount of nonperforming loans to companies at book The most recent major initiative to improve the functioning of the banking sector started in late 2003, when the government decided to recapitalize two of the four major SCBs and introduce changes in legal structure, corporate governance, and risk management, with the goal of bringing in strategic investors and eventually listing the banks. This effort has been partly motivated by the prospects of facing increased competition when, at the end of 2006 under the World Trade Organization agreement, the sector will be opened to foreign paper focuses on reforms in the four SCBs, which continue to be the major part of the banking system in China. At end-2004, the four SCBs—the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), the Bank of China (BOC), the China Construction Bank (CCB), and the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC)—accounted for almost 60 percent of banking system We reviewed the progress in reform implementation and examined lending growth, credit pricing, and regional patterns in lending to look for evidence of changing behavior of the SCBs. While the full impact of the most recent reforms will become clear only in several years’ time, we believe it is useful to explore any changes in the behavior of SCBs—in response to the long-term reform effort and as an initial reaction to the most recent previous studies describe the reform effort and the inefficiency of the Chinese stateowned IMF (2004 and 2005) provides an overview of the most recent reforms and Barnett (2004) reviews the structure and recent developments in the banking sector. For a review of previous banking system reforms, since the mid-1990s, see Karacadag (2003).Duenwald and Aziz (2003) explored the growth-financial-development nexus in China and concluded that, contrary to most cross-country studies, financial development (proxied by total bank lending) has not significantly boosted growth among China’s provinces. Boyreau-Debray and Wei (2005) found that the correlation between investment and savings at the provincial level is strong and increased in the 1990s when SCBs were given more autonomy in allocating regional credit. This suggests the existence of large barriers to capital mobility, possibly in the form of noncommercially motivated interference in bank lending has been made on reforming the SCBs, but more needs to be done to make banks more efficient. The two pilot reform banks, the BOC and the CCB, have likely met the 2005 quantitative targets set in their restructuring plans. They have completed their financial restructuring, introduced new governance structures, and started improving risk management and internal controls. The approval in 2005 of a reform plan for the largest bank in the system, the ICBC, was an important step. Furthermore, all three banks have recently introduced minority strategic investors. However, the last state commercial bank—the ABC—still lacks a restructuring plan. Remaking and modernizing the operations of these banks, increasing their commercial orientation, and establishing a strong credit culture are major undertakings that will inevitably take time to implement and to yield substantial next two sections describe the progress in reforms of two large SCBs that were chosen as a pilot for reforms (the BOC and the CCB) as well as reforms in other banks. Section IV then explores any impact the reforms have had on bank lending decisions, level of credit risk, and credit risk pricing. Section III concludes and outlines key areas for further REFORMS IN TWO PILOT BANKSThe BOC and the CCB were selected as pilot banks for the latest reform effort, whichcommenced in late 2003. In December 2003, the authorities announced the decision torecapitalize these two banks with $45 billion from foreign exchange reserves and to develop a broader reform plan. These plans involved strengthening their corporate governance and risk management, resolving non-performing loans (NPLs), using reputable external auditors to assess the true financial position of the banks, as well as enhancing external oversight of the banks’ operations. The authorities also set the goal of bringing in strategic investors and listing the banks’ , good progress has been made in implementing the reform plans in the two pilot banks. Financial restructuring of the BOC and the CCB has been completed. Both banks have likely met the 2005 quantitative targets, were incorporated as joint stock companies, introduced new corporate governance structures, have worked on changing risk management and internal organization, brought strategic investors, and either were listed (CCB) or appear on track to do so in 2006 (BOC). However, it will likely take time before the ongoing changes become fully BOC and the CCB basically met two 2004 quantitative targets and likely met the firstfull set of quantitative targets for 2005 (Table 1). There were only two quantitative targets set for 2004, the ratio of NPLs to total loans and capital adequacy. The completed financial restructuring, including the $45 billion capital injection and NPL write-offs and sales, helped the two banks meet these , 2004 performance and preliminary information for 2005 suggest that the banks were on track to meeting the first full set of quantitative performance benchmarks at steps have been taken in corporate governance, internal organization, and riskmanagement reforms. Both banks have been transformed into joint-stock companies—the Bank of China Limited and China Construction Bank Corporation—and have put into place a new corporate governance structure with a shareholders’ meeting, board of directors, board of supervisors, and top management operating according to newly adopted rules. The BOC board of directors, for instance, now consist of 13 directors, of which 7 are non-executive directors, 3 are executive directors, and the remaining 3 are international senior financial experts serving as independent Both banks prepared, adopted, and started to implement development plans that deal with a number of operational areas, including internal organization and control, strategic development, and risk management. However, important concerns about governance and internal controls remain. Several scandals, including high-level corruption at the CCB and embezzlement at the BOC, have been uncovered during the implementation of recent reforms. While these were related to events that occurred prior to the reforms, they highlight the need to implement improvements in internal control systems and governance. Furthermore, while the formal corporate governance structure has changed substantially, the way business is done may not have changed much just yet. For instance, recent reports argued that, in the CCB, the board was the nominal final decision maker, but board members were not routinely involved in important Separately, the implementation of reforms in risk management only started, and it will certainly take some time before they are fully implemented throughout the relatively large banks have introduced strategic investors with a minority ownership Byoffering an ownership stake, the banks generally expect to diversify the ownership structure, enhance their capital strength, take advantage of the partner’s management and technology expertise, and launch joint operations in selected areas

Too-big-to-fail: Bank failure and banking policy in Jamaica J. Daleya, , , K. Matthewsb and K. Whitfieldb aDepartment of Management Studies, University of the West Indies, Mona, Kingston 7, Jamaica bCardiff Business School, Cardiff University, Colum Drive, Cardiff, CF10 3EU Wales, UK Received 7 October 2005; accepted 16 December 2006. Available online 22 December 2006. Abstract Research on the causes of bank failure has focused on developed countries, particularly the United States of America. Relatively little empirical work has examined developing countries. We examine the total population of banks in Jamaica between 1992 and 1998 and find that real GDP growth, size, and managerial efficiency were the most significant factors contributing to the failure of banks. Bank failure is defined to include bailout and regulator-induced or supervised merger. Our results suggest that there were implicit ‘too-big-to-fail’ policies during this period. Keywords: Bank failures; Too-big-to-fail; Developing economies; Jamaica JEL classification codes: G21; G28 Article Outline 1. Introduction 2. Bank failure in Jamaica 3. Bank failure literature 4. Data and methodology 5. The likelihood of failure 6. Failure and bail-out 7. Conclusion Acknowledgements Appendix A. Pool of variables References 1. Introduction The last decade of the 20th century was unprecedented in Jamaica's financial history. Of a population of 37 banks, 21 were classified as failed, with 14 being so classified in 1 year—1998. However, few outright closures occurred. Most problem banks were merged with other banks, or continued to operate through financial support from the government. More than a half of domestic banks received some kind of financial support from the government, initiated voluntary bankruptcy proceedings or surrendered their licences. Explanations for such banking problems vary. Empirical research on bank failures separates the causal factors into bank-specific, industry-specific, macroeconomic and other. However, much of the debate on developing countries has neglected banks at the individual level, and has focused on the problems faced at the sector or industry level. Moreover, the (often conflicting) results of existing studies do not offer inferences about the factors that are particularly significant in developing countries, or to those that are significant to the failure of individual banks, or to the fate of problem banks. This paper addresses the following questions: what factors were significant in the banking crisis in Jamaica? What factors influenced how the crisis was handled and was there an implicit too-big-to-fail (TBtF) policy? What are the lessons for bank regulators in developing economies that can assist in better preparedness for the future? To address these questions, the within-sample performance of a panel of Jamaican banks is examined. Some of the factors identified as contributing to failure include deterioration in the macroeconomic environment, rapid expansion and weakness in a range of bank-specific factors: capital, management, and liquidity. The size results are particularly significant and point to the operation of implicit ‘TBtF’ policies. Larger banks are more likely to fail, but are also more likely to be bailed out rather than closed. The next section discusses the banking crisis in Jamaica. Section 3 reviews the literature on bank failures. Section 4 discusses data and methodology. Sections Sections 5 and 6 present the results, and Section 7 concludes. 2. Bank failure in Jamaica The term ‘bank failure’ has been interpreted varyingly. The more precise definitions have focused on accounting factors (for example, [Martin, 1977] and [Benston and Kaufman, 1995]), economic factors ([Bell et al., 1990] and [González-Hermosillo et al., 1997]), or legal factors (Meyer and Pifer, 1970). Conversely, more general definitions have attempted to be all-inclusive and have applied a ‘catch-all’ combination of specific definitions (for example, Thomson, 1992). Using a general definition of ‘bank failure’ embracing closure, bankruptcy, supervised merger, or direct government assistance, we assess the population of banks in Jamaica over the period 1992– Table 1 shows a comparative profile of the Jamaican banking sector before and after the crisis. Table 1. Banking system profile: pre- and post-banking crisis Jamaican banking sector

Interim Measures on Information Disclosure of Commercial Banks Order of the People's Bank of ChinaMay 15, 2002 Chapter I General Provisions Article 1 These rules are formulated on the basis of "Law on the People's bank of China of the People's Republic of China" and "Commercial Banking Law of the People's Bank of China", which aim to strengthen market discipline of commercial banks, standardize information disclosure of commercial banks, effectively safeguard legitimate interests of depositors and other stakeholders and promote safe, sound and efficient operation of commercial banks. Article 2 These rules are to be applied to commercial banks that are established legally within the territory of the People's Republic of China, including domestic commercial banks, wholly foreign funded banks, joint venture banks and branches of foreign banks. Article 3 Commercial banks should disclose information according to these rules, which are the minimum requirements for commercial banks' information disclosure. While abiding by these rules, commercial banks can disclose more information than what has been required by these rules at their own addition to these rules, listed commercial banks should also conform to relevant information disclosure rules published by regulatory body of the securities industry. Article 4 Information disclosure of commercial banks should be proceeded consistent with laws and regulations, the uniform domestic accounting rules and relevant rules of the PBC. Article 5 Commercial banks should disclose information in a standardized fashion, while ensuring authenticity, accuracy, integrity and comparability. Article 6 Annual financial statements disclosed by commercial banks should be subject to auditing by accounting firms that are certified to be engaged in finance-related auditing. Article 7 The People's Bank of China is to supervise commercial banks' information disclosure according to relevant laws and regulations. Chapter II Information to be Disclosed Article 8 Commercial banks should disclose financial statements, and information on risk management, corporate governance and big events of the year according to these rules. Article 9 Commercial banks' financial statements should include accounting report, annex and notes to this report and description of financial position. Article 10 Accounting report disclosed by commercial banks should include balance sheet, statement of income (profit and loss account), statement of owner's equity and other additional charts. Article 11 Commercial banks should indicate inconsistence between the basis of preparation and the basic preconditions of accounting in their notes to the accounting report. Article 12 Commercial banks should explain in their notes to the accounting report the important policy of accounting and accounting estimates, including: Accounting standards, accounting year, reporting currency, accounting basis and valuation principles; Type and scope of loans; Accounting rules for investment; Scope and method of provisions against asset losses; Principle and method of income recognition; Valuation method for financial derivatives; Conversion method for foreign currency business and accounting report; Preparation method for consolidated accounting report; Valuation and depreciation method for fixed assets; Valuation method and amortization policy for intangible assets; Amortization policy for long-term deferred expenses; Accounting practice for income tax. Article 13 Commercial banks should indicate in their notes to the accounting report crucial changes of accounting policy and estimates, contingent items and post-balance sheet items, transfer and sale of important assets. Article 14 Commercial banks should indicate in their annex and notes to the accounting report the total volume of related party transactions and major related party transactions. Major related party transactions refer to those with trading volume exceeding 30 million yuan or 1% of total net assets of the commercial bank. Article 15 Commercial banks should indicate in their notes to the accounting report detailed breakdown of key categories in the accounting report, including: (1) Due from banks by the breakdown of domestic and overseas markets. (2) Interbank lending by the breakdown of domestic and overseas markets. (3) Outstanding balance of loans at the beginning and the end of the accounting year by the breakdown of credibility loans, committed loans, collateralized loans and pledged loans. (4) Non-performing loans at the beginning and end of the accounting year resulted from the risk-based loan classification. (5) Provisions for loan losses at the beginning and the end of the accounting year, new provisions, returned provisions and write-offs in the accounting year. General provisions, specific provisions and special provisions should be disclosed separately. (6) Outstanding balance and changes of interest receivables. (7) Investment at the beginning and the end of the accounting year by instruments. (8) Interbank borrowing in domestic and overseas markets. (9) Calculation, outstanding balance and changes of interest payables. (10) Year-end outstanding balance and other details of off-balance sheet categories, including bank acceptance bills, external guarantees, letters of guarantee for financing purposes, letters of guarantee for non-financing purposes, loan commitments, letters of credit (spot), letters of credit (forward), financial futures, financial options, etc. (11) Other key categories. Article 16 Commercial banks should disclose in their notes to the accounting report status of capital adequacy, including total value of risk assets, amount and structure of net capital, core capital adequacy ratio and capital adequacy ratio. Article 17 Commercial banks should disclose auditing report provided by the appointed accounting firms. Article 18 Description of financial position should cover the general performance of the bank, generation and distribution of profit and other events that have substantial impact on financial position and performance of the bank. Article 19 Commercial banks should disclose following risks and risk management details: (1) Credit risk. Commercial banks should disclose status of credit risk management, credit exposure, credit quality and earnings, including business operations that generate credit risks, policy of credit risk management and control, organizational structure and division of labor in credit risk management, procedure and methods of classification of asset risks, distribution and concentration of credit risks, maturity analysis of over-due loans, restructuring of loans and return of assets. (2) Liquidity risk. Commercial banks should disclose relevant parameters that can represent their status of liquidity, analyze factors affecting liquidity and indicate their strategy of liquidity management. (3) Market risk. Commercial banks should disclose risks brought by changes of interest rates and exchange rate on the market, analyzing impacts of such changes on profitability and financial positions of the bank and indicating their strategy of market risk management. (4) Operation risk. Commercial banks should disclose risks brought by flaws and mistakes of internal procedures, staff and system or by external shocks and indicate the integrity, rationality and effectiveness of their internal control mechanism. (5) Other risks. Other risks that may bring severe negative impact to the bank. Article 20 Commercial banks should disclose following information on corporate governance: (1) Shareholders' meeting during the year. (2) Members of the board of directors and its work performance. (3) Members of the board of supervisors and its work performance. (4) Members of the senior management and their profiles. (5) Layout of branches and function departments. Article 21 Chronicle of events disclosed by commercial banks in the year should at least include the following contents: (1) Names of the ten biggest shareholders and changes during the year. (2) Increase or decrease of registered capital, splitting up and merger. (3) Other important information that is necessary for the general public to know. Article 22 Information of foreign bank branches is to be collected and disclosed by the primary reporting bank branches don't need to disclose information that is only mandated and required for disclosure by institutions with legal person bank branches should translate into Chinese and disclose the summary of information disclosed by their head offices. Article 23 Commercial banks need not disclose information of unimportant categories. However, if the omission or misreporting of certain categories or information may change or affect the assessment or judge of the information users, commercial banks should regarded the categories as key information categories and disclose them. Chapter III Management of Information Disclosure Article 24 Commercial banks should prepare in Chinese their annual reports with all the information to be disclosed and publish them within 4 month after the end of each accounting year. If they are not able to disclose such information on time due to special factors, they should apply to the People's Bank of China for delay of disclosure at least 15 days in advance. Article 25 Commercial banks should submit their annual reports to the People's Bank of China prior to disclosure. Article 26 Commercial banks should make sure that their shareholders and stakeholders could obtain the annual reports on a timely banks should put their annual reports in their major operation venue, so as to ensure such reports are readily available for the general public to read and check. The PBC encourage commercial banks to disclose main contents of their annual reports to the public through media. Article 27 Boards of directors in commercial banks are responsible for the information disclosure. If there is no board of directors in the bank, the president (head) of the bank should assume such a of directors and presidents (heads) of commercial banks should ensure the authenticity, accuracy and integrity of the disclosed information and take legal responsibility for their commitments. Article 28 Commercial banks and their involved staff that provide financial statements with false information or concealing important facts should be punished according to the " Rules on Punishment of Financial Irregularities".Accounting firms and involved staff that provide false auditing report should be punished according to the "Interim Measures on Finance-related Auditing Business by Accounting Firms". Chapter IV Supplementary Provisions Article 29 Commercial banks with total assets below RMB 1 billion or with total deposits below RMB 500 million are exempted from the compulsory information disclosure. However, the People's Bank of China encourages such commercial banks to disclose information according to these rules. Article 30 The People's Bank of China is responsible for the interpretation of these rules. Article 31 These rules shall enter into force as of the date of promulgation and are to be applied to all commercial banks except city commercial commercial banks should adopt these rules gradually from January 1, 2003 to January 1, 2006.中国人民银行令[2002]第6号2002年5月15日第一章 总 则 第一条 为加强商业银行的市场约束，规范商业银行的信息披露行为，有效维护存款人和相关利益人的合法权益，促进商业银行安全、稳健、高效运行，依据《中华人民共和国中国人民银行法》、《中华人民共和国商业银行法》等法律法规，制定本办法。 第二条 本办法适用于在中华人民共和国境内依法设立的商业银行，包括中资商业银行、外资独资银行、中外合资银行、外国银行分行。 第三条 商业银行应按照本办法规定披露信息。本办法规定为商业银行信息披露的最低要求。商业银行可在遵守本办法规定基础上自行决定披露更多信息。上市商业银行除应遵守本办法规定披露信息外，还应遵守证券监督管理机关有关信息披露的规定。 第四条 商业银行披露信息应当遵守法律法规、国家统一的会计制度和中国人民银行的有关规定。 第五条 商业银行应遵循真实性、准确性、完整性和可比性的原则，规范地披露信息。 第六条 商业银行披露的年度财务会计报告须经获准从事金融相关审计业务的会计师事务所审计。 第七条 中国人民银行根据有关法律法规对商业银行的信息披露进行监督。 第二章 信息披露的内容 第八条 商业银行应按照本办法规定披露财务会计报告、各类风险管理状况、公司治理、年度重大事项等信息。 第九条 商业银行财务会计报告由会计报表、会计报表附注和财务情况说明书组成。 第十条 商业银行披露的会计报表应包括资产负债表、利润表（损益表）、所有者权益变动表及其他有关附表。 第十一条 商业银行应在会计报表附注中说明会计报表编制基础不符合会计核算基本前提的情况。 第十二条 商业银行应在会计报表附注中说明本行的重要会计政策和会计估计，包括：会计报表编制所依据的会计准则、会计年度、记账本位币、记账基础和计价原则；贷款的种类和范围；投资核算方法；计提各项资产减值准备的范围和方法；收入确认原则和方法；衍生金融工具的计价方法；外币业务和报表折算方法；合并会计报表的编制方法；固定资产计价和折旧方法；无形资产计价及摊销政策；长期待摊费用的摊销政策；所得税的会计处理方法等。 第十三条 商业银行应在会计报表附注中说明重要会计政策和会计估计的变更；或有事项和资产负债表日后事项；重要资产转让及其出售。 第十四条 商业银行应在会计报表附注中披露关联方交易的总量及重大关联方交易的情况。重大关联方交易是指交易金额在3000万元以上或占商业银行净资产总额1%以上的关联方交易。 第十五条 商业银行应在会计报表附注中说明会计报表中重要项目的明细资料，包括： （一） 按存放境内、境外同业披露存放同业款项； （二） 按拆放境内、境外同业披露拆放同业款项; （三） 按信用贷款、保证贷款、抵押贷款、质押贷款分别披露贷款的期初数、期末数； （四） 按贷款风险分类的结果披露不良贷款的期初数、期末数； （五） 贷款损失准备的期初数、本期计提数、本期转回数、本期核销数、期末数；一般准备、专项准备和特种准备应分别披露； （六） 应收利息余额及变动情况； （七） 按种类披露投资的期初数、期末数； （八） 按境内、境外同业披露同业拆入款项； （九） 应付利息计提方法、余额及变动情况； （十） 银行承兑汇票、对外担保、融资保函、非融资保函、贷款承诺、开出即期信用证、开出远期信用证、金融期货、金融期权等表外项目，包括上述项目的年末余额及其他具体情况； （十一） 其他重要项目。 第十六条 商业银行应在会计报表附注中披露资本充足状况，包括风险资产总额、资本净额的数量和结构、核心资本充足率、资本充足率。 第十七条 商业银行应披露会计师事务所出具的审计报告。 第十八条 财务情况说明书应当对本行经营的基本情况、利润实现和分配情况以及对本行财务状况、经营成果有重大影响的其他事项进行说明。 第十九条 商业银行应披露下列各类风险和风险管理情况： （一） 信用风险状况。商业银行应披露信用风险管理、信用风险暴露、信贷质量和收益的情况，包括产生信用风险的业务活动、信用风险管理和控制政策、信用风险管理的组织结构和职责划分、资产风险分类的程序和方法、信用风险分布情况、信用风险集中程度、逾期贷款的账龄分析、贷款重组、资产收益率等情况。 （二） 流动性风险状况。商业银行应披露能反映其流动性状况的有关指标，分析影响流动性的因素，说明本行流动性管理策略。 （三） 市场风险状况。商业银行应披露因市场汇率、利率变动而产生的风险，分析汇率、利率的变化对银行盈利能力和财务状况的影响，说明本行的市场风险管理策略。 （四） 操作风险状况。商业银行应披露由于内部程序、人员、系统的不完善或失误，或外部事件造成的风险，并对本行内部控制制度的完整性、合理性和有效性作出说明。 （五） 其他风险状况。其他可能对本行造成严重不利影响的风险因素。 第二十条 商业银行应披露下列公司治理信息： （一） 年度内召开股东大会情况； （二） 董事会的构成及其工作情况； （三） 监事会的构成及其工作情况； （四） 高级管理层成员构成及其基本情况； （五） 银行部门与分支机构设置情况。 第二十一条 商业银行披露的本行年度重要事项，至少应包括下列内容： （一） 最大十名股东名称及报告期内变动情况； （二） 增加或减少注册资本、分立合并事项； （三） 其他有必要让公众了解的重要信息。 第二十二条 外国银行分行的信息由主报告行汇总后披露。外国银行分行无须披露本办法规定的仅适用于法人机构的信息。外国银行分行应将其总行所披露信息摘要译成中文后披露。 第二十三条 商业银行无须披露非关键性项目。但若遗漏或误报某个项目或信息会改变或影响信息使用者的评估或判断时，商业银行应将该项目视为关键性项目予以披露。 第三章 信息披露的管理 第二十四条 商业银行应将信息披露的内容以中文编制成年度报告，于每个会计年度终了后的四个月内披露。因特殊原因不能按时披露的，应至少提前十五日向中国人民银行申请延迟。 第二十五条 商业银行应将年度报告在公布前报送中国人民银行。 第二十六条 商业银行应确保股东及相关利益人能及时获取年度报告。商业银行应将年度报告置放在商业银行的主要营业场所，确保公众能方便、及时地查阅。中国人民银行鼓励商业银行通过媒体向公众披露年度报告的主要信息。 第二十七条 商业银行董事会负责本行的信息披露。未设立董事会的，由行长（单位主要负责人）负责。商业银行的董事会、行长（单位主要负责人）应当保证所披露的信息真实、准确、完整，并就其保证承担相应的法律责任。 第二十八条 对在信息披露中提供虚假的或者隐瞒重要事实的财务会计报告的商业银行及有关责任人员，按照《金融违法行为处罚办法》予以处理。对出具虚假审计报告的会计师事务所及有关责任人员，按照《会计师事务所从事金融相关审计业务暂行办法》予以处理。 第四章 附 则 第二十九条 资产总额低于10亿元人民币或存款余额低于5亿元人民币的商业银行，可免于披露信息。中国人民银行鼓励此类商业银行按照本办法规定披露信息。 第三十条 本办法由中国人民银行负责解释。 第三十一条 本办法自公布之日起在除城市商业银行以外的商业银行范围内施行。城市商业银行自2003年1月1日起到2006年1月1日分步施行本办法。只有一篇